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Abstract
In this paper we describe the different NLP techniques designed and used
in collaboration between the CLLE-ERSS research laboratory and the CFH /
Safety Data company to manage and analyse aviation incident reports. These
reports are written every time anything abnormal occurs during a civil air flight.
Although most of them relate routine problems, they are a valuable source of
information about possible sources of greater danger. These texts are written
in plain language, show a wide range of linguistic variation (telegraphic style
overcrowded by acronyms or standard prose) and exist in different languages,
even for a single company/country (although our main focus is on English and
French). In addition to their variety, their sheer quantity (e.g. 600/month for
a large airline company) clearly requires the use of advanced NLP and text
mining techniques in order to extract useful information from them. Although
this context and objectives seem to indicate that standard NLP techniques
can be applied in a straightforward manner, innovative techniques are required
to handle the specifics of aviation report text and the complex classification
systems. We present several tools that aim at a better access to this data
(classification and information retrieval), and help aviation safety experts in
their analyses (data/text mining and interactive analysis).
Some of these tools are currently in test or in use both at the national and
international levels, by airline companies as well as by regulation authorities
(DGAC1, EASA2, ICAO3).
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1. Introduction
Air transportation, like other safety-critical activities, has seen the design
and deployment of a large variety of safety-management procedures. Many of
these efforts rely on a steady stream of reports that relate any abnormal event
at any phase of activity and at any level of gravity.
This data is extremely valuable for learning lessons from past incidents and
accidents, and hence for identifying new threats to safety and providing means
of avoiding them. As in any complex system, the origin of these threats can
be technical, organisational, environmental or human, or (most of the time) a
combination of the above.
Because of this, national and international regulation bodies, as well as trans-
port companies, store a large collection of reports for analysis.
Manual analysis of these reports is complex and requires considerable re-
sources. Each safety event contains, in addition to other information, a descrip-
tion of the facts written in natural language, and each event is assigned codes
from predefined taxonomies. Complexity arises, on the one hand, from the need
to categorize the reports (given the size of the taxonomy, the users’ knowledge,
etc.) and, on the other hand, from the need to analyze and understand the re-
ports from a global point of view. Our goal is to develop tools to help categorize
and analyze the data.
CFH / Safety Data has been working on different aspects of these report sys-
tems for more than 10 years, in collaboration with the CLLE-ERSS linguistics
laboratory. This paper is a wide-spectre presentation of the joint research we
have conducted in order to integrate natural language processing (NLP) tools
in the management of aviation safety reports. This work has been performed
in close collaboration with both the data providers and the end users (safety
experts). This article is organised as follows:
Section 2 presents a synthetic view on the existing aviation safety reporting
systems and data, and summarizes the different tasks that have been identified
for NLP to fulfil.
In Section 3 we present the most straightforward of our approaches: the
classification of reports. A classical problem for NLP, it can quite easily be dealt
with using supervised machine learning techniques based on textual content,
and we show it succeeds when non-extreme conditions are met. Although this
method is currently used by some companies and authorities, this solution is
limited by the classification process itself, which is not adapted to a constantly
changing environment and cannot be used for the identification of emerging
threats.
We propose to address this problem with inductive methods that aim to
mine patterns in the text data, and lead to the proposal of categories that
can be compared to existing ones. We describe in Section 4 an experiment with
probabilistic topic models on a large collection of reports, with mixed results that
cannot conclude on the utility of this method in the specific case of extensively
described and annotated data such as the repositories used in aviation safety
management.
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In the following two sections we present how specifically designed interactive
tools can be useful to assist experts in their exploration of these huge and
complex databases.
In Section 5 we propose a method based on the notion of document content
similarity. The timePlot search tool is already used by several safety experts in
France and enables them to quickly identify reports that are similar to a target
occurrence and thus to find possible antecedents to a single event.
The last approach (Section 6) uses an active learning procedure in order
to assist an expert circumscribe a known but not thoroughly defined aspect
of incidents. Contrary to a fully inductive statistical approach, it is based on
the ability of an expert analyst to quickly define the raw contours of a target
category of threat. We present a proof of concept of this method that encourages
us to propose such a solution to safety analysts.
In the conclusion, we discuss the extension of these techniques and processes
to other fields of activity, and adress the delicate problem of evaluating such
techniques.
2. Overview of aviation safety reports
In 2012 the probability of dying on a single flight on one of the top 39
airlines was one in twenty million. Indeed, safety in air travel is constantly
improving. ICAO (2013) reports 2012 as the year with the lowest accident rate
(3.2 accidents per million departures) since they started keeping the record. In
the vast majority of cases, even when something serious, such as an in-flight
engine malfunction, occurs, the accident is avoided and the aircraft lands safely.
Even more often something could have happened but was avoided in time thanks
to specific equipment, training or safety procedures.
All of these reassuring facts are the results of constant efforts at improving
safety at every level of the complex system that enables air transportation.
One of the procedures that helps define appropratie safety measures is incident
reporting.
2.1. Principles of incident reporting
Incident reporting is a large-scale process that enables (encourages, and
sometimes requires) parties to relate any abnormal event (or occurrence) to
a central entity that collates and then uses this data for safety prevention pur-
poses. This is mostly done in a non-punitive manner, i.e. the purpose is not to
blame the person making the report, even if he admits that he made a mistake
at some point. Quite on the contrary, such feedback loops help the personnel
feel directly involved in the safety process. It should be noted that in some case
parties are also invited to share their positive experience given that this kind of
feedback (adequate procedure, team work, etc.) is as important as problematic
events to improve safety.
Johnson (2003) identifies several arguments for setting up such a procedure,
the main ones being:
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• incident reports indicate why an accident did not occur, and help identify
both the sources of danger and the safeguards;
• incidents are much more frequent than accidents, and can be submitted
to quantitative analyses, giving insights into the main sources of danger;
• the data obtained is cheap—much cheaper than the cost of accidents,
especially in the industrial and transportation sectors.
In addition to these obvious advantages, regulatory decisions may compel
civil aviation companies or administrations to set up a reporting system. In-
deed, in most countries, reporting serious incidents to the regulation authority
is mandatory.
The exact architecture of a report system varies from simple centralised
repositories to complex control procedures and feedback loops, but the minimal
structure is as follows:
1. The reporter writes a relatively free-form text describing the incident,
along with a small set of metadata (mostly concerned with the time, the
location and the equipment involved) and generally assigns a category (see
below).
2. The report is checked by a receiver who assesses its compliance, and some-
times add comments, remarks and/or metadata.
3. The report is stored in a database where it is indexed according to its
metadata.
4. Analysts access the database in several different ways, ranging from sim-
ple queries and statistics that estimate the frequency and evolution of
incident types, to data-mining investigations in order to identify emerging
dangerous situations.
As for any collection of data, organisation and indexing are crucial to its
usefulness. However, the very nature of the reports’ origin makes it difficult
to correctly organise and index them. The spontaneity of their writing by
anonymous personal (as anonymity is an important part of the non-punitive
aspect of incident reporting) and the large number of reports are the two main
obstacles that analysis procedures have to deal with.
2.2. Sample systems and data
Although many different reporting systems exist at different levels for com-
panies, government agencies and NGOs, we present two of the most widely used.
ASRS is a North-American database of incident reports, while ECCAIRS is a
software system proposed by Europe for managing incident reports at different
levels.
4
2.2.1. ASRS
ASRS (Aviation Safety Report System) is the oldest and most famous vol-
untary incident reporting program for aviation. It is managed by NASA and
collects voluntarily-submitted reports of aviation events in the United States4.
Operational since 1976, ASRS has processed over a million incident reports and
averages 6736 submissions monthly (322 daily), with an increasing rate over
the years. This system targets several types of events from different types of re-
porters: general reports from pilots, Air Traffic Control reports from controllers,
maintenance reports from mechanics and cabin reports from cabin crew.
At the end of the intake process a typical ASRS report consists of one (or
several) narrative fields and a set of descriptors. The narrative fields correspond
to the report submitted by the author(s) and a summary (or synopsis). The first
set of descriptors that accompany the textual part of the report provide detailed
objective information about the location, time, weather conditions, equipment
and people involved, etc. In addition, more interpretative descriptors are used
to described the event with controlled values (categories); these and the synopsis
are coded by the ASRS experts upon reception and analysis of the occurrence.
A sample narrative is reproduced in Figure 1.
As we made our approach and landing into RAP we were cleared to exit
Runway 32 via Runway 5 and taxi in via Alpha. Once we landed in the
rain the visibility quickly diminished while trying to exit the runway. We
inadvertently turned onto Taxiway B which is approximately 40-60 feet prior
to the Runway 5 intersection. Taxiway Bravo is supposed to be closed due
to new concrete that was poured but the taxiway was only barricaded from
taxiway Alpha and not the Runway 32 side. So we ended up halfway on
Bravo. The lack of proper markings and barricades combined with the late
evening hours and poor weather conditions led to our wrong turn. Luckily we
were able to prevent any further incident and get tugged back on the runway
and taxied on the specified taxiways.
Figure 1: Sample ASRS report narrative (ACN 1189955)
The descriptors follow a strict list of values that are hierarchically organised
in a two-level taxonomy and are of paramount importance when analyses are
performed. Aspects of the incident are grouped around entities. Each entity
represent a logical grouping of descriptors. Aspects dealing with the aircraft, for
example (make/model, operator, flight phase, filed flight plan, etc.) are grouped
into the Aircraft entity. A separate Person entity is created for each person that
played a role in the incident. In the report in Figure 1, for example, two people
were involved (the captain and the first officer) and for each one, information
such as their experience, function and location in the aircraft is coded. Also,
since 2009, human factors information relating to each person is also coded at
4http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
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this level. In the above mentioned example, the captain was confused by the
markings and this information is coded in an attribute to the relative Person
entity. The Events entity concerns information about the events that took place.
In the example in Figure 1 eight attributes in the Events code that there was a
ground incursion during taxiing, that it was detected in time by the flight crew
and that, as a result, they requested clarification from the tower and became
reoriented. Finally an Assessments entity summarises the incident, stating the
primary problem and the identified causes and contributing factors. The above
example is analysed as an ambiguous incident where weather, human factors
and issues at the airport were contributing factors.
Given that ASRS capture data since the 1970s, the form of the reports
evolved considerably over time. In roughly the first two decades of its exis-
tence, the system imposed a particular writing style to the report narratives.
Rather than writing in standard English, the reports were keyed in using a semi
controlled and standardised language, making heavy use of abbreviations for
common aviation terms such as ACFT for aircraft and WX for weather. The
reports were also written using only capital letters. Figure 2 shows an example
of this writing style, along with its “translation”.
FLT (flight) WAS SBND (southbound) ON J-209 AND HAD BEEN CLRED
(cleared) TO FL390a BY A PREVIOUS CTLR (controller). OVER SBYb
VORc, CLIMBING THRU (through) FL360, TFC (traffic) WAS CALLED
BY ZDCd NBOUND (northbound) AT FL370 AND 4 MI (military) TFC
(traffic) WAS OBSERVED AND CENTER THEN HAD US DSND (descend)
TO FL350.
aFlight Level 39000 feet
bSalisbury–Ocean City–Wicomico Regional Airport
cVHF Omni Directional Radio Range navigation system
dWashington Air Route Traffic Control Center
Figure 2: Sample ASRS report narrative using the old writing style (ACN 145677)
Variations in style is inherent to the incident reports systems, and their is a
wide continuum between the two sample reports reproduced here, across both
time, culture and authors. Part of the task of managing this data is to cope
with such disparity.
ASRS data is public and can be queried like any traditional database, through
an online form in which the user expresses boolean restrictions on the descrip-
tors, in combination with a simple word search in the narrative parts5. ASRS is
the world-wide reference for incident reporting systems, frequently cited as an
example even for other sectors of activity such as medicine (Helmreich, 2000).
5Altough the proposed text search utility is rudimentary, and does not even provide a
correspondence between ”CTLR” and ”controller”, which have both to be entered in the
engine in order to achieve reasonable results.
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2.2.2. ECCAIRS
ECCAIRS (European Coordination Centre for Accident and Incident Re-
porting Systems) is an ongoing effort at standardising accident and incident data
collection and exchange within the European Union (Menzel, 2004). Developed
by the European Commission’s Joint Research Center, ECCAIRS’s mission is
“to assist national and European transport entities in collecting, sharing and
analysing their safety information in order to improve public transport safety”
and is freely available to any interested party. It takes the form of a software
platform that covers most of the collection, indexing and querying of incident re-
ports. It is currently used by several national agencies, among them the French
DGAC6.
The reports collected by DGAC are similar to those of ASRS, with the
notable distinction of being written in several languages (French and English).
A sample report is shown in Figure 3, with specific data (location, company,
makes, etc.) anonymised as requested because the data is not publicly available.
Weather was forecasted with snow and moderate icing in [LOCATION ] area.
Runway 09R was closed in [AIRPORT1 ] according to ATIS broadcast. During
final 09L, preceding aircraft advised TWR of slippery runway, what led TWR
to ask us to go around for a standard procedure to [AIRPORT1 ]. Several
holding patterns were turned over [AIRPORT1 ]. Some time later, on our
request, approach advised us of an expected 10 minutes delay. At that point,
fuel on board was around 1180 kg including divertion reserve of 970 kg (in
icing conditions) to [AIRPORT2 ], where the runway was declared only wet.
Roughly, these 210 kg of extra fuel represented slightly a little more than
3 turns over [AIRPORT1 ]. Holding 10 more minutes would have been led
us very close to minimum fuel, as a result of which captain decided not to
wait and divert to [AIRPORT2 ]. Fuel trip to [AIRPORT2 ] was much smaller
than expected (200 kg) thanks to direct vectors. At the end of radar down
wing leg to runway 09 [AIRPORT1 ], ATC advised that 09L in [AIRPORT1 ]
was declared open again. Normal landing in [AIRPORT1 ] with 980 kg of fuel
onboard instead of 630 kg calculated over [AIRPORT2 ]. ATC was professional
and helpful.
Figure 3: Sample DGAC report in ECCAIRS
In ECCAIRS also, additional information is represented by controlled meta-
data attributes. The taxonomy followed is ICAO’s ADREP7 (ADREP, 2010).
The ADREP taxonomy is the result of an effort at standardisation of aviation
incident and accident information supported by ICAO (Stephens et al., 2008)
and is intended for a very broad coverage. Unlike ASRS’s taxonomy, ADREP
is before all an international standard and thus needs to potentially adapt to
6Direction ge´ne´rale de l’aviation civile
7Accident/incident Data REPorting
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every possible situation and scenario. Similar to ASRS, both factual descriptors
(time, place, aircraft models, engine and component manufacturers etc.) and
information resulting from the expert’s analysis of the occurrence, such as event
types and contributive factors are organised in a complex multilevel hierarchy
with more than 800 attributes and 160,000 possible values.
The ADREP taxonomy has proven to be very useful when used correctly,
facilitating data exchange and providing a common frame of reference when
speaking about incidents and accidents in aviation (Stephens et al., 2008). How-
ever most of the time, fine-grained categorisation is simply not available, as in
the case of the DGAC database we are working with, where only a third of the
occurences are coded with the occurrence category, and even less for more pre-
cise information such as event types, the main branch in ADREP for abstracting
information about the precise sequence of sub-events that occurred.
The occurrence category attribute has a closed list of 37 values providing
high-level classifications for occurrences. The occurrence in Figure 3, for ex-
ample, is classified as an ATM 8 and a FUEL related occurrence. This main
category is the target of the classification system described in Section 3.
Every European country maintains an ECCAIRS database, and these are
merged at the community level by EASA9. The ECCAIRS software platform
allows for complex querying of the databases, with a clear focus on helping the
user manage the complexity of the taxonomy, at the expense of textual search.
Unlike ASRS, ECCAIRS databases are not public and their target users are
safety managers and analysts.
2.3. Identifying tasks for NLP
Having presented an outline of the data gathered and managed in incident
report systems, we now take a closer look at their usage.
According to Johnson (2002):
There are two central tasks that users wish to perform with large-
scale incident reporting systems. [...] On the one hand, there is a
managerial and regulatory need to produce statistics that provide an
overview of how certain types of failures are reduced in response to
their actions. On the other hand, there is a more general requirement
to identify trends that should be addressed by those actions in the
first place.
In other words, the user should be able to quantify any relevant aspect of
an event (cause, effect, factor, etc.), study its evolution in time and space,
and query the link between several factors. He should also be able to identify
new configurations that have led to dangerous situations, and to detect the
emergence of new problems.
8Occurrences involving Air Traffic Management (ATM) or communications, navigation, or
surveillance (CNS) service issues.
9European Aviation Safety Agency
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These tasks are quite straightforward, as long as they rely on techniques
applied to the metadata. Indeed, it is easy to get an overview of the frequency
of incidents implying ground markings if such an aspect is clearly encoded in the
database. Analysing this aspect as a function of other characteristics (airport,
time of the day, airplane model, etc.) is also non-problematic. Identifying
correlations with another aspect of an incident (crew fatigue, etc.) can be done
with standard data-mining techniques. This aspect of the task is not within the
scope of our approach.
In any event, the feasibility of these tasks primarily relies on the taxonomy-
controlled descriptors that summarise the reports’ content and these important
features need to be hand-coded, either by the reporter or by a safety manager.
Given the flow of incoming reports and the complexity of the taxonomies, this
can be a costly and difficult task, and classification errors can easily occur, with
serious effects downstream
We thus identify a first task where NLP techniques are useful: since the
essentials of the event are described in a natural textual form, it should be
possible to infer some of these metadata descriptors from the narrative. This
task of automatic text classification is presented in Section 3.
However, taxonomies are limited in the sense that categories are generally
too broad to allow the identification of a specific characteristic of an event (John-
son, 2002). For example, an expert might be interested in improper marking
and signalisation in an airport (as evoked in the sample report in Figure 1). In
the ASRS taxonomy, the corresponding metadata feature is contributing fac-
tor:airport, and a query on this field would obviously lead to a large quantity of
noise. In the more detailed ADREP, we can find the following hierarchy:
Event >
Aerodrome & ground aids >
Aerodrome systems >
Markings >
Apron marking
Runway marking
Taxiway marking
Obstacle marking
In reality, the metadata rarely descends this deep into the hierarchy, staying
at the upper two levels of the ADREP taxonomy as noted before. Besides, this
level of detail is generally accompanied by a greater difficulty for the human
coder to choose between closely related values (such as Taxiway and Runway
markings in our example), and leads to unreliable metadata with a poor inter-
annotator agreement (Johnson, 2002).
The alternative is to rely on the narrative part of the report, in which the ex-
plicit information is given in textual form. Our question is thus: is it possible to
use the variety of expressions found in the narrative parts to identify stable cat-
egories? These categories can either match metadata, or be more fine-grained,
or even help new previously ignored patterns emerge. This inductive building
of categories can be done by statistical methods such as topic modeling, which
we present in Section 4.
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However successful these methods turn out to be, they still cannot system-
atically provide a solution to the specific needs of an expert, nor to the very
fine-grained investigation of emerging sources of danger. In order to do this, we
must place the expert at the heart of the process, and have him in control of
the access to the database, along with his thorough knowledge of both data and
domain.
Navigation in these huge databases is a complex task, and although full-text
retrieval can be useful, its results are not always satisfactory on such heteroge-
neous data. Based on the experts’ expression of their needs, we have designed
a similarity-based tool that enables the user to visualise and access the reports
similar to a single occurrence selected by the user. This approach and the
timePlot tool are described and discussed in Section 5.
Moreover, browsing the database and identifying occurrences cannot lead to
an operational answer to the tasks evoked by Johnson. Certain aspects of the in-
cidents such as phenomena relating to human factors (fatigue, confusion, stress,
etc.), are particularly elusive with respect to full-text searches, and require a
more global approach than the one provided by incident similarity. These as-
pects need to be clearly identified and automatically marked, thus enabling the
automation of their retrieval and their inclusion in statistics and data-mining
investigation techniques. We propose to use a semi-automated technique based
on active learning that enables the user to iteratively design a classification
model that efficiently isolates the target aspect. We describe this technique and
exemplify its uses in Section 6.
The tools and experiments presented in this article cover only certain aspects
of how natural language processing techniques could be used in the domain of
safety incident reports: indeed, Andre´ani et al. (2013) have identified that NLP
techniques can be useful at any of the phases of an incident report lifecycle,
from the initial reporting to the analysis.
3. Automatic report classification
In this section we present automatic document classification techniques to
improve the usability of large databases of incident reports. The principle of
classification is to assign a category from a closed list of possible values (here
a taxonomy-constrained metadata) to an item (here a report) according to its
characteristics (here its textual content). This classical task is usually accom-
plished through the use of a supervised machine learning algorithm that con-
structs a model of the task by observing a volume of previously categorised
data.
Such a tool was developed by CFH / Safety Data and used on a French
airline company’s internal occurrence reporting database as described in Pimm
et al. (2012). It consists of a system based on learning the correlations between
automatically extracted linguistic descriptors and coded values from the airline’s
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SMS 10 taxonomy. Each time a new occurrence arrives, the system calculates
one or more categories to be assigned and proposes them to the safety expert
in charge of indexing the report. Although not perfect, this system can easily
identify the most common situations and thus preserve the expert’s available
time for more uncommon and potentially more dangerous occurrences.
Here we present a similar system designed to be used on the French DGAC’s
database of incident and accident reports. We describe the learning mechanisms
and evaluate different configurations on real data.
3.1. Context
The DGAC is France’s national aviation regulator and collects occurrence
data from a variety of entities operating on French territory. Mandatory report-
ing policies dictate that aviation incidents must be recorded by companies, air-
ports and air traffic controllers and forwarded to the DGAC’s central database.
The implementation of reporting policies in France is very successful today, in
terms of number of reported incidents and accidents. This makes France the
most productive contributor to the EASA european database (DGAC, 2013).
The database we are working with contains more than 400,000 occurrences col-
lected over the past ten years, with approximately 45,000 incoming reports per
year, a number constantly on the rise. Reports are mostly written in French
(97%), although their authors make heavy use of technical aviation terms bor-
rowed from English.
The DGAC uses the ECCAIRS environment and the ADREP taxonomy for
managing their occurrence data. As we already pointed out in 2.2, ADREP
provides a very detailed scheme for incident categorisation, using an elaborate
hierarchy of descriptors. The task of categorisation is highly time-consuming
and, given the volume of reports, is very demanding for the safety experts.
One of the branches of the ADREP taxonomy is the occurrence category11
providing a high-level description of the corresponding event. In theory, every
event can be reliably categorised using one or more of the 37 labels. A con-
sistently labelled database would allow safety experts to examine trends and
statistics based on the labels, as well as filtering incident searches by label.
Like the rest of the ADREP taxonomy, the labels themselves are normalised
and are associated with a set of conditions that describe when they should be
used. Table 1 shows some of the categories with their associated descriptions
and their relative frequency.
3.2. Corpus size and category distribution
The DGAC’s database currently consists of 404,289 occurrence reports from
2004 until September 2014. Among these, only one third are labelled with
10Safety Management System.
11A slightly out-of date list of all the categories and the associated descriptions and usage
notes is available at http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Occurrence_Category_Taxonomy.
The latest version is available as part of the ECCAIRS software package at http://
eccairsportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
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Label Description % reports
ATM Occurrences involving Air Traffic Management or
communications, navigation, or surveillance (CNS)
service issues.
40.6
BIRD Birdstrike - Occurrences involving collisions / near
collisions with birds.
7.3
RE Runway excursion - A veer off or overrun off the run-
way surface.
0.7
GTOW Glider towing related events. 0.03
Table 1: Examples of ADREP occurrence categories
at least one occurrence category. We limited our study to reports written in
French. The corpus used in our study thus contains 136,861 documents, which
amount to a total of 15 million words.
The categories themselves are very unevenly distributed as can be seen in the
examples in Table 1. The most common category is ATM, assigned to 40.6%
of the corpus, while 25 of the 37 labels concern less than 1% of the reports.
Some categories are very poorly represented: for example, GTOW, the category
concerning glider-towing related incidents, concerns only 46 reports or 0.03% of
the corpus (in addition to the rarity of these events, this category was recently
added to the taxonomy).
The ADREP scheme considers that an occurrence can be described with
more than one label, which leads to a multi-label classification situation. Among
the labelled reports of the database, 95% have one category, 4% have two cate-
gories and only 1% have three or more (maximum 6).
3.3. Features and training
We used the Support Vector Machines, or SVM (Fan et al., 2008) supervised
learning algorithm, as this technique has proven to get excellent results for
document classification tasks (compared to alternatives we have also tried, such
as Maximum Entropy). However before applying SVMs, text data has to be
transformed into features describing the content of each report with numerical
values.
After extracting the textual parts (narratives) of the 136,861 French cat-
egorised documents from the DGAC corpus we applied a custom rule-based
normaliser developed by CFH / Safety Data, and based on the Talismane NLP
toolkit12 (Urieli, 2013). This normaliser currently comprises 637 hand-written
rules that fold some frequent common variations to a standard term. In these
reports, common terms such as “take-off” for example can have multiple vari-
ants (“T/O”, “take-off”, “takeoff”, “T-O”, “take off”). Other multi-word terms
12http://redac.univ-tlse2.fr/applications/talismane
12
such as “check list” and “glide slope” follow the same pattern of variation and
are folded to a single term by the normaliser13. All numerals are also normalised
to a generic token “#NUMBER#”, all characters are folded to lower case and
accentuated characters are replaced with the corresponding deaccentuated ones.
After this normalisation, we constructed the following text units:
• words: The words from the text, as detected by a standard white space
and punctuation tokenizer.
• stems: Word stems as detected by the Snowball stemmer14 designed for
standard French.
• character n-grams. All substrings of n characters contained in the text.
We limited n to 3 and 4.
• stem n-grams. All sequences of n contiguous stems contained in the text.
We limited n to be between 2 and 6 and extract only those sequences that
don’t start or end with a function word such as a determiner or preposition.
The total number of features reaches 8 million in this experiment. The num-
ber of unique features for each type is indicated in Table 2 along with the total
number of occurrences and the sparsity (average frequency per feature). Longer
stem n-grams are limited in number due to the constraint on function words.
No feature selection was performed based on frequency for this experiment.
Feature type Unique Occurrences Sparsity
stem 156,176 14,637,737 93.73
word 182,931 14,637,737 80.02
characterNgram-3 132,664 82,915,335 625.00
characterNgram-4 742,270 82,647,113 111.34
stemNgram-2 689,105 3,180,313 4.62
stemNgram-3 1,502,468 3,291,545 2.19
stemNgram-4 1,759,628 2,632,952 1.50
stemNgram-5 1,703,677 2,128,725 1.25
stemNgram-6 1,529,965 1,778,064 1.16
Table 2: Breakdown of features
Once these units are clearly identified, we computed the relative frequency
of each unit in each text and thus got a representation of each report as a vector
of numerical features. The sets of units described above can be combined and
allow different feature configurations to be considered.
Training (i.e. the construction of the predictive model) was performed with
the java port of the Liblinear library15 (Ho & Lin, 2012). As this is a multi-
label classification problem, we in fact trained 37 independent binary classifiers,
13As previously stated, reports written in French make heavy use of English terminology.
14http://snowball.tartarus.org/
15http://liblinear.bwaldvogel.de/
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one for each target category. This means that each report to be categorised is
analysed by these 37 classifiers, and given an independent yes/no answer for its
association with the 37 possible categories.
We used a linear kernel for these SVM classifiers. Using only the words set
of features we performed a grid search on a single fold of a 10-fold experiment
(see below), finding the optimal parameters C =0.5 and  = 0.1.
3.4. Evaluation
In order to evaluate the classifier we performed a ten-fold cross validation.
From the 136,861 documents we constructed a training corpus consisting of 90%
of the documents and kept the remaining 10% of the documents for testing. We
repeated this partitioning 10 times so that each document is present exactly
once in the test corpus.
Using the setup described above, for each run we trained several sets of
classifiers using different combinations of features. For each combination we
calculated the micro-average precision, recall and F1-score (i.e. considering
the assignment of a category to a document as an individual event). Table 3
summarises the average results for several combinations over the ten runs.
Feature combination P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
words 84.95 71.08 76.46
stems 84.61 73.10 77.92
words + stems 85.21 71.03 76.60
stems + sn3 86.79 74.08 79.15
stems + sn3 + cn4 85.74 72.12 77.55
Table 3: Evaluation of different feature combinations
The best performing combination uses stems and stem n-grams of length 2
and 3 (sn3). The overall results are encouraging with a F1-score of nearly 80%.
In terms of features, these results show that using a stemmer produces better
results than using non-normalised words, and that trying to combine stemmed
and unstemmed words makes the results even worse. Adding character n-grams
(cn4) also worsens the performance of the classifier.
We had a closer look at the results of our best configuration. First of all,
we found obvious inconsistencies in the original coding. One of the errors we
identified was a common confusion between some of the categories and the
OTHR16 category. When looking through the errors concerning the RAMP17
category we identified that events concerning spillage of fuel while refuelling
were (correctly) classified by the tool as RAMP events, while in the training
16Other - the catch-it-all category defined as “Any occurrence not covered under another
category.”
17Ground Handling - Occurrences during (or as a result of) ground handling operations.
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corpus, roughly one out of five18 such events had been attributed the OTHR
category.
Another common classification error is between the LOC-G (Loss of control
on the ground), ARC (Abnormal runway contact) and RE (Runway excursion)
categories. All three concern events that happen upon touchdown, and as such
share a number of expressions (runway, touchdown, landing gear, etc.). LOC-
G is meant to be used if the crew actions leading to the loss of control were
posterior to the moment of touchdown. ARC is used for event where the landing
was abnormal. In both cases, if the aircraft at some point left the runway, RE is
the correct code. When looking closely at the classification mismatches between
these three categories, missing or incorrect codes in the evaluation corpus are
as common as automatic classification errors.
Category Count P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
ATM 55614 96.31 93.09 94.67
BIRD 9943 96.08 93.01 94.51
MAC19 7503 91.54 84.72 87.99
SCF-NP20 9529 80.31 62.42 70.18
SCF-PP21 2530 72.15 53.92 61.68
RE 943 87.62 77.61 82.04
GCOL22 850 59.62 36.47 45.26
Table 4: Detailed scores per category
Table 4 shows detailed results of the classifier’s performance for various cat-
egories. It appears that our classifier gets very good results (with a precision
exceeding 90%) for several categories, among which we can find some that are
very frequent, such as ATM and BIRD.
Other categories are inherently difficult, even when frequently used. There
are many components in an aircraft and they all may fail. The (non-powerplant)
system component failure category SCF-NP, whose frequency is comparable to
the bird strike category, is much more difficult to recognise. The difficulty comes
partly from the fact that a component failure will constitute a larger event and
the crew’s actions (such as declaring an emergency, troubleshooting the error
jointly with ATC) will be reported. This surplus of information creates a much
harder problem to solve for the classifier.
Finally, while data rarity is an obvious issue when considering machine learn-
ing approaches, it has not been too problematic in the present study. The RE
category, for example, concerns only 94.3 occurrences on average and is classi-
fied with relative reliability. For other rare categories, such as GCOL (ground
18Determined by a manual examination of 200 documents.
19MAC: Airprox/ACAS alert, loss of separation, (near) midair collisions.
20SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant].
21SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction.
22Ground Collision.
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collision) the performance is much worse and can be attributed to a combination
of rarity, difficulty23 and inconsistency24.
3.5. Usage scenario and limits
Based on these results, we can extend the usage scenario already in use
for the airline’s database to the ADREP metadata scheme. More precisely,
the categories for which our classifier reaches the 90% efficiency threshold can
be proposed in a computer-assisted coding of the incoming reports. Those
for which precision exceeds 95% are even considered to be processed without
human verification. This means that some events are sufficiently stable through
their corresponding reports that we can free the experts from addressing them
through a complete reading of the report. This allows them to focus on more
specific cases that cannot be satisfactorily managed by automated means. There
is no absolute threshold for assessing the reliability of such a system, but it
should be mentioned that some training schemes only require the trainees to
reach 75% accuracy (Johnson, 2003, p. 768).
Although we did not report the experiments here, similarly good results have
been achieved for other metadata such as flight phase (cruise, landing, etc.)
and occurrence class (accident vs incident). This confirms that simple NLP
techniques such as the ones used here can be easily applied to this situation.
On the other hand, the other parts of the ADREP coding scheme are out
of reach of such techniques. The next descriptive branch, Event types has more
than 1,600 categories (dispatched on 3 hierarchical levels). Data sparseness is of
course the major obstacle here, as well as a lower quality of the data available at
this level, given how complex it is even for an expert to clearly and unambigu-
ously identify the exact tag to be used. Such low-quality unbalanced training
data generally means that machine learning is a waste of time, especially given
the quality requirements of the safety management process.
In this section we presented how machine learning can be used to classify doc-
uments according to predefined categories. We also hinted on how taxonomies
in general, and ADREP in particular can be misused and altogether ill-suited for
the particular safety-related task at hand. Nevertheless taxonomies are essential
as they provide the necessary abstraction for data-driven safety management.
Unlike the the aviation sector, most other sectors lack normalisation efforts such
as the one producing and maintaining ADREP. Meanwhile, textual descriptions
of safety-related events are piling up by the thousands. In the next section
we will present how probabilistic topic modelling addresses the data abstraction
problem in a bottom-up manner by determining the thematic structure of a
23There are several categories dealing with collisions.
24When reviewing the data, we are convinced that this particular category is largely under-
represented: there are many events that should be coded GCOL and are not.
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(large) corpus of texts. In this sense topic modelling has the potential to serve
as a first step when one is designing a taxonomy for a particular sector.
4. Topic modelling of incident reports
Probabilistic topic modelling is a generic method initially designed by David
Blei (Blei et al., 2003; Blei, 2012). Following older methods of documents repre-
sentation such as Latent Semantic Indexing (Deerwester et al., 1990), its main
purpose is to represent a collection of documents in a vector space with a re-
duced number of dimensions or topics (as opposed to traditional vector spaces
where each dimension corresponds to a single term or word). These topics or
latent dimensions are calculated without any kind of supervision or external
knowledge, based solely on the distribution of words in the documents. Thus,
the topics are supposed to be a good representation to the underlying thematic
structure of the collection.
Topic modelling has attracted considerable attention from the NLP commu-
nity in the past decade, and has been used in a number of applications ranging
from information retrieval and document classification to the summarisation of
the main themes addressed in a document collection. It is this specific use that
led us to applying them to incident reports. Former successful experiments have
been run on collection of scientific publications (Hall et al., 2008), newspaper
articles (Newman et al., 2006) and encyclopedia entries (Blei, 2012).
4.1. Topic Modelling in a nutshell
The statistical techniques behind topic modelling make a number of assump-
tion that can be summarised as follows: a document is essentially a set (or bag)
of words; a document expresses a number of topics of varying importance ac-
cording to a specific distribution; a topic is expressed with words according to
a specific distribution. Thus, by observing a collection of documents, one can
empirically estimate the two distributions (document-topic and topic-words)
that fit the observed frequencies of words in documents. The basic version of
topic modeling details this crudely defined method by selecting a well suited
distribution (Dirichlet, hence “Latent Dirichlet Attribution” the name of the
most widely used version of topic modeling) as well as the algorithms that can
estimate the actual parameters.
From a practical point of view, given a collection of documents (essentially
their decomposition as bags of words), a fixed number T of topics and a few
hyper-parameters, a topic modeling session produces two matrices.
The first one is a document-topic matrix in which each document is described
as a vector across the T topics. In other words, it tells us what topics are the
most important ones for each document. This information can be used as such
for indexing and comparing document within a smaller vector space.
The second matrix is a topic-word matrix in which each of the T topics is
represented as weights associated to each word. In other terms, it gives the
words most frequently associated to each topic. This information can be used
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to interpret the topics and enable a user to get a readable description of a
document in terms of topics.
4.2. Experiment with ASRS data
The experiments we performed on safety reports were designed to answer
the following questions:
• Is topic modelling suitable to the nature of our data?
• Are the identified topics relevant to our needs?
• Do these topics actually capture new interesting aspects of events?
The following experiments details are as follows, although they are presented
more thoroughly in (Ribeiro, 2014). We used a collection of 167,350 documents
from the ASRS database (from 1987 to 2012), and extracted the narrative parts
for a total of 17 million words. We used the TreeTagger part-of-speech tagger to
use word lemmas instead of wordforms and to remove function words (preposi-
tions, determiners, numbers, etc.). In order to deal with the language variation
in the history of ASRS (as described in Section 2.2), all technical words were
replaced with their standard acronym (ACFT, WX, etc.). Finally, all tokens
were folded to lowercase.
Topic models were computed using the Gensim library (Rˇeh˚urˇek & Sojka,
2010) using the standard method25 (Gibbs sampling) with a target number of
topics T = 50. Calculation takes about 2 hours on a 4-core 3.1GHz processor
computer.
Although this method is non-deterministic, we could observe through sev-
eral runs that the results are quite stable, as it has already been observed for
corpora this size. The choice of 50 topics is arbitrary, but was finally chosen
as the number for which interpretation of the resulting topics was the most
satisfactory(see Section 4.4): we will now come to this crucial phase.
4.3. Interpreting the topics
As explained before, a topic model for a given corpus consists in two matrices,
document×topic and topic×words. The “Main terms” column of information
shown in Table 5 comes from the topic×words matrix. This column contains, for
5 sample topics26, the 15 words that have the highest probability of expressing
it according to the Dirichlet distribution estimated from the observed word
distribution. This information is traditionally used for describing a topic to
a user and used for testing the relevance and cohesion of this representation
(Chang et al., 2009).
A safety expert was presented the 15 most contributing words for each of the
50 topics, and was asked to describe in a few words what each of these topics
25The hyper-parameters were left to their default value: α = 1/T , β = 1/T , 50 passes.
26The topics’ order is insignificant as it is an artefact of the randomisation process at the
beginning of the modelling process.
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# Main terms Expert Metadata (R)
1 rwy, txwy, taxi, hold, short, gnd,
twr, clr, acft, tkof, line, clrnc, ctl,
cross, pos
Ground anomaly:ground incursion
(0.65); phase:taxi (0.65)
2 day, hr, time, trip, crew, duty, flt,
night, fatigue, rest, leg, fly, min,
morning, late
Fatigue anomaly:company policy
(0.11)
3 pax, flt, attendant, cabin, smoke,
capt, cockpit, seat, back, crew,
acft, emer, told, smell, lndg
Cabin anomaly:flight deck/cabin
(0.60)
4 wx, ice, turb, flt, tstm, moder-
ate, rain, icing, acft, severe, radar,
area, light, encounter, condition
Weather primary problem:weather
(0.45); anomaly:inflight event
(0.37), component:weather
radar (0.12)
5 acft, checklist, flt, call, capt,
maint, lndg, make, l, fo, flap,
time, control,return, continue
??? primary problem:aircraft
(0.24); anomaly:equipment
(0.24); detector:flight at-
tendant (0.23); compo-
nent:turbine(0.13); compo-
nent:flap control (0.13)... (6
more)
Table 5: The 5 first topics extracted from the ASRS corpus
could mean. His feedback is presented in the “Expert” column of Table 5. For
43 topics out of 50 the expert was able to identify a theme or a small set of
themes that could be expressed by the words with the highest probability values.
Although some of the words may seem opaque to a layman, most of them are
in fact quite transparent. Contributing words for topic 4, for example comprise
both the overal category (WX is the standard acronym for weather), various
meteorological phenomena (ice/icing, rain, thunderstorm (TSTM )), common
modifiers (light, moderate, severe) or consequences (turbulences (TURB)); all
this makes it an easily interpretable topic. This is not the case for topic #5,
where no coherence could be found, as the most contributing words are scattered
across several aspects of flying an airplane.
The document×topic matrix provides us with another means for interpreting
the topics: each document is represented by a vector of weights across the
50 topics. That means that each topic can be viewed as a distribution over
the documents, and as such can be compared to the documents’ metadata (as
described in § 2.2). We thus computed Pearson’s correlation coefficient between
each topic and each metadata value across the documents (considering 1 if
the document’s metadata contain this value, and 0 otherwise). This gave us a
different, more objective angle to interpret each topic, as we could identify which
metadata value was the most strongly associated to each topic. These values
are indicated in the “Metadata” column of Table 5, along with the correlation
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coefficient’s score27.
First, we can see that for some topics (number 1, 3 and 4 in our selection)
one or two highly correlated values (> 0.4) can be identified, and that these
confirm the expert’s interpretation. Other attributes can appear as secondary
correlates, such as flight phase and reporting person, but nevertheless it appears
that such topics have captured a well-known aspect of incident reports. This
is the case for 38 of the 50 topics. It has to be noted that any aspect of a
report can be thus “captured” by a topic. For example, one particular topic
was associated to flights in California, the contributing words being the names
of locations in this traffic-dense area.
A second case is that of the topics that could easily be identified by the
expert but do not show any marked correlation with the metadata. This is
the case for topic 2 in our selection, where the only correlated attribute is the
company policy, although with a very low score. This kind of topic is extremely
interesting, as it shows that corpus analysis by this kind of method can make
some aspects of incident reports emerge. Only 2 of these could be identified in
the 50 topics examined in our experiment: fatigue and flight planning28. It is
important to note that the fatigue attribute was added to the ASRS taxonomy,
along with other human factors, in 2009. Even though the subset it covers is
too small for meaningful results, and is heavily biased because of this temporal
constraint, partial analysis indicates that this topic is highly correlated to this
attribute.
The 10 remaining topics could not be associated to any single aspect of
reports. This is the case for topic 5 in our selection, where the correlated
attributes are numerous and scattered, making no more sense to the expert
than the contributing words. Other configurations in this category are topics
for which several identifiable topics are mixed together.
4.4. A mitigated success
Although we only performed a limited number of experiments with topic
modelling on incident reports, we can outline answers to our initial questions.
It appears that topic modelling is very suitable for our data. It is a very
robust method that takes clear advantage of large collection of redundant doc-
uments as it is the case for incident reports. Most of the topics identified are
in fact relevant aspects of these documents, as can be seen through an expert’s
interpretation. However, only a small fraction of identified topics are both rel-
evant and independent from the metadata attributes, and as such provide an
added value.
27Only the attributes with a positive correlation higher than 0.1 are presented. This thresh-
old was chosen arbitrarily as the population is too large to have non-significative correlations
scores.
28This topic more precisely concerns documents where the pilot evokes the flight preparation
regarding available fuel, departure time or alternate routes, such as in the report presented in
Figure 3.
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One of the main limitations of this approach is the granularity of the ex-
tracted topics, especially when it is compared to the level of details attained
in the organised description and indexing of aviation incident reports. As seen
in the previous analysis of the resulting topics, most of the topics do little less
than confirm an organisation that is clearly expressed by some of the metadata.
If in some cases this method can identify non-encoded aspects, they are diffi-
cult to detect among other unavoidably noisy topics. However, this technique
can be extremely valuable for reports database that are not supported by a
thorough classification scheme and extensive metadata. This can be the case
of databases that need to be consolidated, or even for the replacement of an
unsuitable taxonomy.
On the technical level, topic models are somewhat sensible to a number of
parameters, the first of which is the requested number of topics. We performed
several tests on the same data with T = 10, T = 100 and T = 200. None of
the topics among the 10 were interpretable, as they all mingle several aspects
of the reports. Interesting things happened with 100 topics, including the clear
and expected separation of topics (from the 50 described above) that could
be identified as an agglomeration of quite distinct sub-topics by the expert.
However, this led to only a few such improvements, most other topics were
deemed unnecessarily split. With the highest tested value (200), many resulting
topics were related to geography, with high-weighted tokens corresponding to
airports, beacon codes and city names (mostly in the US). Although these topics
were coherent and easily interpreted, their informational value seems quite low.
Finally, we could identify a few very stable topics across the variation on T ;
this is the case for topic 2 (related to fatigue) that was found almost identical
in all experiments with T > 50. In the end, the optimal value for T cannot be
evaluated without a complete and thorough interpretation of resulting topics,
and is estimated to be highly dependent on the collection of documents.
We found few similar studies where topic models were used to analyse and/or
process incident reports. Pereira et al. (2013) have used topic modelling in order
to estimate the duration of a road traffic incident based partly on the text of
the first notification. Although their interpretation of the extracted topics is
minimal, they get good results mixing metadata and topics, the latter being in
general good predictors of the incident duration, although they did not compare
this approach to a more traditional word vector space method.
This experiment confirms, along with the classifier described previously, that
most important aspects of incident reports can be captured by the narratives.
The next two sections focus on helping the user efficiently make use of these
texts to efficiently browse and query the database, with or without the help of
categorical metadata.
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5. Identifying similar reports with the timePlot system
In this section we describe another tool that has been successfully imple-
mented and is currently in use by safety managers for browsing incident reports
databases. The timePlot search engine retrieves reports that are similar to a
source report and displays them along a temporal axis for easier visualisation.
We first present the original need that underlies the development of timePlot,
then describe the tool itself and finally we discuss its limitations and introduce
the next generation of systems.
5.1. The need for report similarity
Johnson (2003, p.735) gives the following reason that motivated the de-
velopment of computer system for managing an incident report database (our
emphasis):
Identifying trends. Databases can be placed on-line so that investi-
gators and safety managers can find out whether or not a particular
incident forms part of a more complex pattern of failure. This does
not simply rely upon identifying similar causes of adverse occur-
rences and near misses. Patterns may also be seen in the mitigating
factors that prevent an incident developing into a more serious fail-
ure. This is important if, for example, safety managers and regu-
lators were to take action to strengthen the defences against future
accidents.
Discussions with the safety managers and analysts from several companies
and regulation authorities confirmed Johnson’s stress on the importance of
browsing a database while looking for similarities. This concept is essential
to the discovery of recurring events that need to be avoided. More precisely, the
scenario we address in this section is the following: given an already identified
occurrence (and its report), can we quickly and easily find other occurrences in
the database that share the same characteristics? The similar features can be
of any nature: time, place, type of aircraft, weather, flight conditions, problem
encountered, actions taken, results, etc.
The need for identifying similar occurrences is manifested in two types of
situations. The first one is the monitoring of the incoming data flow. Whenever
a report arrives, the initial receivers may want to verify if this incident is an
isolated occurrence or is part of a larger trend. If it is part of a trend, he would
want to estimate the frequency of the events in question, judge the risk they
represent and, if necessary, take corrective actions.
The second situation is when a decision is made to investigate into a par-
ticular issue or risky scenario. In such a case the experts need a large body of
examples covering all possible aspects for a qualitative analysis. In this situa-
tion, one way to approach the problem is to identify (usually from their memory
and intricate knowledge of the database) a particular prototypical occurrence
and then use it as a query to search the database for similar reports.
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Take the example in Figure 3. In an ideal ECCAIRS world all relevant
aspects of the occurrence will be coded in the metadata and all other occurrences
in the database will also have coherently coded values. A user would then be
able to use this report as a source and query the database looking for reports
that share all or most of its characteristics. He will find many reports where
there were deviations to an alternate airport. Quite a large subset will probably
concern occurrences where extensive delays (holding) lead to burning a lot of
fuel and hence to the decision to divert. A larger-than-normal subset of those
might concern a diversion from some other airport—i.e. not the airport given
in the example in Figure 3. The expert would not have thought of looking at
that particular airport in the first place, but now will find it interesting and
would want to investigate further. He might find out that the cases concerning
that airport almost always implicated bad weather conditions. A pattern is
identified. If this is the case, it may lead to changing minimal fuel requirements
for this destination or training the crews to better prepare for the probability
of diversion if bad weather is forecasted for that destination.
All of the above-mentioned bits of information are also present in the nar-
rative. Given that, as we saw, metadata is not always adequate (or available)
we built a system that relies only on the report narratives to identify similar
reports. The main advantage of using narratives is their availability and cover-
age: there are always free text narratives associated with incident reports and
they contain all of the information expressed by the reporter. The downside is
that, although present in the narrative, the information is less structured and,
moreover is very noisy. In the above-mentioned example, the reporter tells of
a wet runway at the destination airport. This information is not of primary
importance for the occurrence and an expert coder would probably not have
included it in the metadata. A narrative-based similarity system however will
consider wet runways as a feature for similarity.
When designing the text-based similarity system we took into account this
trade-off and made use of interactive visualisation technique, allowing quick and
easy access to the results but at the same time explaining why the results are
as they are. For this reason we privileged straightforward and simple linguistic
processing as it means less opaque treatment, and is directly understandable
by the users. Another (typical) trade-off when designing information retrieval
systems is finding the precision/recall sweet spot. Following the transparency
principle we decided for a high-recall strategy coupled with easy filtering. The
initial results are noisy but the users have the possibility of further refining and
filtering them with a few mouse clicks. Again, this follows the initial demand
where the expert should be able to refine his information need little by little
as he analyses the results. In the hypothetical scenario described above, the
fact that a pattern was identified for a totally unrelated airport depended at
first on a loose interpretation of similarity. Such a use pattern is typical in the
processes of discovering trends and making connections when performing safety
investigations.
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5.2. Overview of the timePlot system
The general principle of the timePlot system is straightforward. For a given
report (the source report) the tool identifies similar reports among the ones
that are indexed in its database. The reports are presented chronologically on a
two-dimensional scatterplot. Each point represents a report: the higher a point
is, the more similar the report it represents is with the source report.
Figure 4: timePlot user interface
On Figure 4 we see snapshot of the timePlot interface when applied to the
DGAC database of French reports described in Section 3. The source report
concerns a laser pointer incident report as source and many similar incidents are
displayed on the scatterplot underneath. The graphical disposition of the points
on the scatterplot allows the user to instantly identify this particular incident
type29 as a trending one, as most of the similar reports are concentrated towards
the right-hand side of the plot.
29In 2008, relatively cheap and extremely powerful laser pointers became available for pur-
chase online and in some specialised stores. For some reason some people started pointing
them at approaching aircrafts, creating a serious safety hazard. Of course, no metadata
enables the coding of this specific problem.
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Similarity with the source is represented by the vertical position of the points
on the plot. The ones high on the plot share many of the source’s characteristics.
Point lower on the graph are less similar, and thus potentially irrelevant. The
user can quickly verify the precise words shared by any two reports by hovering
with the mouse on the corresponding point. As is visible on Figure 4 the shared
words are highlighted in the text of the source report. Hovering on a point also
presents the title of the corresponding document and clicking on the point opens
a dialog window containing the entire document.
The filter bar on the lower part of the screen allows the user to filter out
reports based on keywords and metadata, and thus to focus on a subset of
the retrieved reports. In addition, the user can select a similar report and
make it the new source report, thus interactively exploring the database in an
hypertextual way.
These features are all intended to facilitate the navigation within the set
of similar reports. By minimising the effort the users have to make in order
to understand a given output of the system we can intentionally allow for a
noisier output and higher recall. Instead of “being forced to continually navigate
’another 10 hits’ to slowly identify relevant reports” (Johnson, 2002), users
can examine the graph and, by hovering on several points and looking at the
highlighted terms, they get a good enough idea on the composition of the results
and further formulate their search strategy.
5.3. Calculating Similarity
The core of the similarity calculation is also straightforward. Given any pair
of documents, the system produces a similarity score, between 0 and 1 represent-
ing the relatedness of the documents. The score is based on the lexical overlap
of the narrative parts of the two documents. The more words they share in
common the more similar the documents are. This is a classical implementation
of the vector-space Information Retrieval principles (Manning et al., 2008), al-
though the similarity is calculated between documents and not between a query
and a document.
The details of the processing chain is as follows. First the texts are tokenized
and stemmed, and a stoplist is applied to select the terms in each report. The
first processing stages are identical to the processing described in Section 3.
Each document is represented by a vector where each dimension correspond-
ing to a term in the collection, and each value is the relative weight if this term
in the document. We used the classical TF*IDF measure, that takes into ac-
count both the numbers of occurrence of this term in the document and the
rarity of this term in the collection.
Finally two documents are compared by computing the cosine (or dot prod-
uct) between the vectors that represent them.
This classical approach to similarity is quite rudimentary in regard to recent
development in IR. It considers each document as a bag of words (without taking
word order into account) and does not make use of term similarity (synonymy
or other semantic relationships) either through specific linguistic resources nor
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unsupervised statistical methods. This has been our choice for a practical rea-
son, which is to keep the similarity as transparent to the user as possible. Also,
this word-level similarity between reports allows a greater interaction with the
user, such as word filtering.
5.4. TimePlot in use
TimePlot has been proposed to aviation safety experts at both the national
(France) and European level. It is currently in active use in the French DGAC
and in advanced testing in a French airline company’s safety intelligence service
awaiting integration in their safety management system.
A standard evaluation of this tool along the NLP standards, i.e. running
it on a gold standard data and assessing its efficiency in terms of precision
and recall, has not been performed as the task itself does not comply with the
requirements of such an approach.
Instead, we have been observing its use both quantitatively through auto-
mated logs and qualitatively through user experience and feedback.
At the DGAC, where the tool is at a most mature stage, there are currently
136 active users. Data is synchronised with their ECCAIRS database on a
monthly basis. We have had a largely positive feedback from the users and
the DGAC are also starting an occurrence data sharing programme supported
by the tool. The operators (airports and companies) willing to share part of
their incident data will get free access to the tool with all the data that other
operators participating in the programme have shared. Currently 5000 queries
are performed yearly at the DGAC alone.
One interesting scenario concerns the airline’s testing of the tool. As part of
the test we had provided the tool loaded with a database of publicly available
incident reports. One of the questions that the safety officers were interested
in concerned events that occurred at some of their diversion30 airports. For
one particular airport in central Russia, the tool identified a larger than nor-
mal concentration of runway overruns—cases where the landing aircraft did not
manage to stop in time. The problem was related to improper drainage of the
runway surface and the company updated the procedures for landing there in
case of emergency according to these findings.
In another case the experts were asked to investigate a series of specific
incidents. The identification of similar incidents over an extended time period
allowed them to determine that the original cluster was ”a statistical accident”
and not a developping trend, thus avoiding the (very coslty) creation of a special
investigative task force.
Another success story is related to regulation about the use of mobile phones
on airplanes, which changed recently and led the company to consider allowing
30Airports to be used in case of an emergency. Having accurate and up to date information
about these airports is problematic for companies, as they do not use them during normal
operations. At the same time, the need for such information is of paramount importance when
performing an emergency landing.
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their use in the cockpit by the pilots. Using the tool, they searched for reports
about possible interferences and found one case where a mobile phone of a
passenger seated in one of the front rows interfered with crucial instruments.
Based on this, it was decided to maintain the ban in the company’s standard
operating procedure.
5.5. The next step: targeted search
By monitoring the actual use of the timePlot system by its intended au-
dience, we found that in some situations the system was used well beyond its
designed limits.
Let us recall that the system is intended to help the identification of similar
occurrences; after processing, the user can tackle the initial noise by filtering the
results using a combination of keywords and metadata fields. In a later version
we introduced31 the possibility fo a user to manually enter or copy/paste a report
narrative and the system would compute its similarity with stored reports.
We noticed that at some cases this functionality was not used to find a
scenario, but rather to model a certain aspect of an incident. Users would input
a variety of semantically related words or variants in the full-text field essentially
using the system as a (crude) full-text search engine. After calculation, the users
would scan the scatterplot, identify reports not matching their initial need and
try to filter them out with keywords and Boolean operators.
A user would, for example enter fatigue, tired, rest, and sleep in the full-text
field. In this example the user tries to identify reports where fatigue was a
factor. Afterwards, when looking at the results the user would notice that some
reports mention ”metal fatigue32” and then apply a filter excluding the word
metal from the results. The realisation that one of the initial terms (fatigue)
is ambiguous, and that searching for it yields irrelevant results would come
when looking at the results after the first iteration and not be expressed in the
initial query. This type of narrowing down of the search criteria and progressive
specification of the information need through query reformulation is typical for
modern information seeking strategies (Jansen et al., 2009).
This example shows how a clear understanding of both the tools and the data
they manipulate allows the users to devise more intricate strategies to satisfy
a given need for information. The timePlot tool, not being designed with such
a use in mind naturally does not yield optimal results. However the fact that
it was used in such a way clearly indicated that such needs must be addressed
with a purpose-built system. More importantly, it indicated that the users are
willing to engage in such an iterative information seeking process with multiple
“round trips” from search to data.
Such behaviour from the users is understandable in the sense that the infor-
mation they seek is ever more elusive. The term “non-technical signal” came
31This possibility was introduced for purely technical reasons. The initial update cycle of
the application was too slow and at some cases the users didn’t want to wait before checking
for similar reports.
32Fatigue is used to denote the weakening of a material under forces.
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about in one of our discussions, making a distinction between technical matters
that are clearly identifiable with simple terms (such as the names of specific
components) and non-technical matters, such as human factors issues where
key-word approaches are not powerful enough to reflect complex issues such as
confusion or distraction.
In the end, whereas modern search engines put the emphasis on precise
results with minimal engagement, we observed that in the context of searching
for complex issues in noisy textual data, a human could not be expected to
produce a coherent enough query ex nihilo. The tools, rather than simply
aiming at the best possible result, should let the user “build a relationship”
with the data they manipulate. After a first (underspecified) query, the tool
ideally would give a picture of both signal and noise and allow the user to build
on that impression to further refine their need and adapt to the underlying
reality of the data.
In the following section we present an approach to capturing non-technical
signals using active learning, which, by keeping the user in the loop, allows for
such a progressive refinement of the information need.
6. Interaction and active learning
We described in the previous section how the timePlot tool was (mis-)used
to model a facet of an incident, rather than to look for similar incidents. This
usage scenario led us to design an approach that relies on the availability of an
expert and use a variant of machine learning techniques: active learning (Olsson,
2009). These variants are based on traditional supervised learning methods, but
take into account the fact that training data are expensive to get when an expert
is required for labelling items. Active learning strategies try to make a smart
usage of the expert’s time by submitting to his judgment only the difficult or
borderline items. This can only be done through an iterative process with a
dose of interaction with the user.
In this section we describe the intended approach, the algorithm we designed
and a simulation we are currently running as part of AnonymisedCompany ’s
R&D program in order to better understand the behaviour of the active learning
approach and tune it before we submit it to real users.
6.1. An interactive approach to signal detection
The system we present here is based on the observations of the use of the
timePlot tool and on the successful performance of the machine learning ap-
proach described in Section 3. The basic idea behind the system is to allow the
users to model a given aspect of an incident by providing examples of documents
that are related to the particular aspect. We start with the assumption that the
aspect is partially identifiable by a query using a full text search engine and/or
available metadata. A user interested in confused flight crews will presumably
start by querying the system for documents containing the word “confusion”.
This set will, however contain some documents that do not match the user’s
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information need33. When looking through the documents, the user will notice
this and would like to exclude them from the search. At the same time there will
be documents that do not contain the word “confusion” and that are relevant.
The system should also be able to identify such documents.
We have systematised this process into what we have call “creating a Dimen-
sion”. A Dimension, from a user’s point of view is a dynamically created label
that can potentially apply to any report in the corpus, as well as any new report
introduced. Conceptually, creating a Dimension can be compared to introduc-
ing a new metadata attribute / value pair to an existing taxonomy. However,
the difference is that we seek to render the process the least time-consuming as
possible and not require extensive coding of all the existing reports.
From a system’s point of view a Dimension is no more than a classifier that
produces a yes/no partitioning of the corpus. The algorithm described in the
next section shows the process for creating and training this classifier.
6.2. Active learning algorithm
The outline of our system is the following: we start with a rough estima-
tion of what the expert considers as the target (positive) reports. We train a
classifier based on this data, and then apply it to the entire collection. Due to
the nature of classification algorithms (and their need for generalisation), this
classifier provides a different set of positive reports. Using the error margin (or
probabilistic confidence score) provided by the classifier, we can identify border-
line reports, on both sides of the decision: we select these few fairly positive and
fairly negative items and submit them to the expert’s judgement. Based on his
decisions, we obtain a new approximation of his needs, and can train another
classifier, and so on until the expert reaches a satisfactory result. This active
learning principle is also called uncertainty-based sampling and has been pro-
posed in a number of NLP tasks such as information extraction (Kristjannson
et al., 2004) and semantic role labelling (Roth & Small, 2006), among others.
Algorithm 6.1 shows in details the active learning algorithm for training a
Dimension. Given a corpus C of safety reports, we wish to calculate a dimension
vector D assigning a dimension yes/no value to each document in the corpus.
The expert kicks the system off by providing an initial approximate set of pos-
itive examples P. These are either the result of a keyword search for keywords
highly suggestive of the target dimension, a set of similar reports identified with
timePlot or a handful of manually selected documents. The system also requires
a set of training parameters which depend on the classifier used (e.g. C and 
for a linear SVM classifier), and a set of training features F to represent the
textual content of the reports (see § 3). The final input parameters are the
“bootstrap” threshold t, giving the minimal distance from the SVM hyperplane
33Consider documents speaking for confusing call signs, for example. XX259 and XX299
flying at the same time in the same area makes it rather hard to communicate with ATC over
the radio but does not necessarily amount to the flight crews being confused about what they
are supposed to do.
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Input: corpus C, initial positive set P, training parameters, feature set
F , bootstrap threshold t, review count n
Output: dimension vector Dn
1 T ← new training set;
2 T .p ← P;
3 T .P ← ∅;
4 T .N ← ∅;
5 i ← 0;
6 repeat
7 // Train model
8 T .n ← random sample with cardinality (|T .P|+ |T .p|)− |T .N| ;
9 Train model Mi using T .P ∪ T .p as positive and T .N ∪ T .n as
negative examples and F as features;
10 // Calculate dimension vector
11 T .p ← ∅;
12 Di ← new dimension vector;
13 foreach doc ∈ C indexed by j do
14 Di[j] ← apply Mi to docj using F ;
15 // Bootstrap calculated positives
16 if Di[j] > t then add docj to T .p;
17 end
18 // Review marginal documents closest to hyperplane
19 for n positive and n negative docs /∈ T .P ∪ T .N closest to
hyperplane do
20 Expert reviews docj ;
21 Expert adds docj to T .P or T .N ;
22 end
23 i← i+ 1;
24 until expert satisfied ;
25 return Di;
Algorithm 6.1: Iterative dimension training
for a document to be included in the positive set on the next iteration, and the
review count n giving the number of documents to be reviewed at the end of
each iteration in the margin of the SVM hyperplane.
The training set T is comprised of four sets of documents: T .P, the real pos-
itives which have already been reviewed by the expert, T .N , the real negatives
which have already been reviewed by the expert, T .p, the positives automati-
cally calculated by the previous model above the bootstrap threshold (initially
provided by the expert in P), and T .n a random sample of documents assumed
to be negative, with a cardinality to balance the positive and negative examples.
It is of course possible (and desirable) to give reviewed positives and negatives
a higher weight than calculated positives/random negatives.
At each iteration, the system first trains a new modelMi given the current
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training set T . It then calculates a new dimension vector Di using the model
Mi. Within the algorithm, we’ll assume D contains a real positive or negative
distance from the SVM hyperplane, although it is trivial to convert this to a
yes/no answer by taking positives to be yes and negatives to be no. Finally,
the system reconstructs T as follows: T .p is automatically calculated by taking
all documents where the distance from the hyperplane exceeds the bootstrap
threshold. The expert is then asked to review the n documents closest to the hy-
perplane margin on both sides, and determine whether they are really positives
or negatives, assigning them respectively to T .P or T .N . The assumption is
that correctly reclassifying a small number of documents in these marginal areas
allows us to converge much more quickly than a random review of documents.
The learning ends when the expert is satisfied with the dimension values as-
signed to documents—presumably when the hyperplane correctly distinguishes
the majority of documents reviewed.
6.3. Simulation and discussion
In order to better understand the behaviour of the system and assess its
usefulness, we ran several simulations using existing metadata as a validation
criterion, substituting itself to the expert’s judgement. At each iteration, reclas-
sifying the documents from the marginal areas is done based on whether they
are true positives or negatives for the target metadata attribute.
We used the same classifier and feature set as described in Section 3, i.e. a
linear SVM based on stems and stems n-grams. For an estimation of the classi-
fier’s margin we used the probabilites provided by the libLinear library, which
are based on the distance between an item and the trained model’s hyperplane.
The bootstrap threshold t is set at 0.8.
As a metric of performance, at each iteration we measured precision, recall
and F1 scores for overlap between the documents identified by the system and
the documents classified according to the target metadata attribute.
Table 6 shows the results of the simulation on a subset of the French DGAC
corpus consisting of 44,191 documents (arbitrarily selected on a temporal crite-
rion from the whole corpus described in Section 3). The task consists of creating
a Dimension for bird strikes. The initial set T .p contains all documents that
contain the word “oiseau”34. We have set the review count n to 10, meaning
that at each iteration the 10 positive and 10 negative items with the lowest mar-
gins are submitted to the expert (or here, have their status revised according to
their metadata).
The first row of Table 6 shows the state of the system at query-time. The
query has returned 1,534 documents. From those, 1,413 are considered true
positives (have the occurrence category BIRD). The query is quite precise, with
a precision of 92.11%, but its recall is 43.85%, meaning that less than half of
the documents categorised as BIRD contain the word “oiseau” (in fact, most
reports signal the exact species of bird encountered).
34“bird” in French.
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The second row shows the state of the system after a model has been trained
on the initial set. T .p now contains the documents classified by the model.
While no “human” reclassification has yet been performed, 346 new true positive
documents have already been correctly identified by the system.
The subsequent rows show the state at each iteration. At iteration 3, for
example the expert has reclassified a total of 40 documents (28 as positives and
12 as negatives). After the corresponding retraining, the system identifies 176
more true positives as compared to the state at iteration 1. We can see that the
F1 score is steadily increasing with each iteration, illustrating how expert input
on a small amount of documents iteratively refines and tunes the classifier.
i T .p T .P T .N True+ P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
0 1534 0 0 1413 92.11 43.85 59.42
1 1957 0 0 1759 89.88 54.59 67.93
2 2035 17 3 1804 88.65 55.99 68.63
3 2205 28 12 1935 87.76 60.06 71.31
4 2379 41 19 2104 88.44 65.30 75.13
10 3347 140 40 2877 85.96 89.29 87.59
Table 6: Results for bird strikes (DGAC corpus)
Table 7 shows the results of another simulation, this time on 7,025 documents
from the American ASRS database (selected on a temporal criterion from the
corpus described in Section 4). We simulated the search for incident reports
where confusion was a factor and we use the Human Factors attribute of the
Person entity as a validation criterion. We tested for those documents classified
with the value Confusion. The initial query is the word “confusion”.
While this configuration is closer to the real-word use the system is intended
for, it is also a much more difficult task than identifying bird strikes. This
difficulty can be estimated by training a simple classifier for this metadata: our
best configuration achieved only 66% F1-score, while we saw in Section 3 that
we could reach 95% for the BIRD category in the DGAC corpus.
Accordingly, the system performance is worse than in the previous scenario,
but the behaviour is comparable. At iteration 3 the system has identified 253
more true positive documents with only 40 being submitted to the expert for
validation. After 10 iterations, even though the F1 score is still below 50%,
recall has doubled.
Globally these results are encouraging. They demonstrate that it is possible
to better capitalise on the expert’s time and, with this type of active iterative
process, effectively “propagate” the judgement to a large proportion of the doc-
uments. While validating the general principle, these experiments also pose a
number of questions. The most important one currently is the relationship be-
tween the initial query and the output of the system. We have observed that the
system behaves differently depending on both the precision and the recall of the
query. We also observed that, depending on the query, varying parameters such
as the bootstrap threshold, the review count and the additional weight given
32
i T .p T .P T .N True+ P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
0 774 0 0 472 60.98 25.46 35.92
1 1048 0 0 574 54.77 30.96 39.56
2 1280 14 6 670 52.34 36.14 42.76
3 1443 24 16 725 50.24 39.10 43.98
4 1564 26 34 765 48.91 41.24 44.74
10 1936 57 123 900 46.49 48.54 47.49
Table 7: Results for confusion (ASRS corpus)
to documents already reviewed have different effects and can greatly improve
performance. As we can not have control on the query itself, we are searching
for methods to automatically determine the optimal values of these parameters.
We are also looking forward to building the graphical user interface and propos-
ing the system to real word users. This will allow for much more realistic testing
as we will be able to directly measure performance based on the proportion of
yes/no judgements at each iteration.
7. Conclusion
The work presented in here, in addition to providing an operational solution
to identified safety needs, addresses a number of more general issues.
First, the problems faced by experts attempting to analyze a large quan-
tity of textual data in order to find emerging dangers and risks are present
in a large variety of industrial contexts: energy (power plants, oil and gas ex-
traction), transportation (railway, buses, rapid transit systems), heavy industry
(chemistry, founderies, manufactures), health, etc. Each domain of activity and
individual structure (company, state or international regulation organisation)
is different in terms of volume, reports origins, textual characteristics, etc. Al-
though common methods and techniques can be identified, that fact remains
that specific approaches have to be followed for each situation. Nevertheless,
aviation safety is seen as the field where the most advanced incident reporting
systems have been developed, and has been taken as an explicit example by
varied studies.
These solutions, developed in such a resource-rich and advanced environ-
ment, can now be redesigned and adapted to more virgin domains. Certain
techniques might be particularly applicable to such domains. Indeed, while the
lack of metadata and training material can be an obstacle for automatic classi-
fication with supervised techniques, this state of affairs encourages us to deploy
unsupervised techniques such as topic modelling in order to clear the ground
and get a first global vision of the main tendencies expressed by data. In some
cases, more generic methods and tools can be directly transferred.
33
This is the case of an application that CFH / Safety Data has started in the
domain of nursing homes, for which most of the problems and solutions men-
tioned in this article are relevant. These institutions produce incident reports
and categorize incidents according to a taxonomy of activities (drug adminis-
tration, nursing, laundry, etc.). As for aviation, these reports are emitted by a
range of personnel, are written in a technical style and contain a large number
of acronyms. Although the taxonomy is oriented towards technical issues, most
of the safety managers’ concerns are aimed at orthogonal aspects such as human
factors and arduousness of work. This naturally calls for the identification of
specific dimensions such as presented in Section 6. The report system, although
it covers a large number of houses, is more flexible than the international stan-
dards of aviation: this means that a closer inspection of the reports (e.g; with
techniques such as topic modelling presented in Section 4) can be considered in
order to modify the taxonomy.
Another domain in which we have already applied similar techniques is the
space industry, and more specifically satellite manufacturing. In these proce-
dures where extreme precision is expected, reports are written for each encoun-
tered case of non-conformity with the technical requirements. Managers have
defined a generic taxonomy to describe these reports, with wide-coverage cate-
gories such as severity and causes. Efficient monitoring of this database is now
performed through an adapted version of the timePlot tool.
Secondly, in the majority of interesting cases, the target concepts and signals
sought by safety experts are not formalised until the problem has been clearly
identified.
Contrary to the information retrieval model of “finding a needle in a haystack”,
in the mentioned cases we do not even always know what a needle looks like.
This raises a number of problems, not the least of which being the evaluation
of proposed technical approaches. NLP, like other empirical fields, distinguishes
intrinsic and extrinsic evaluation (Spa¨rck Jones & Galliers, 1996). Intrinsic
evaluation targets the efficiency of the tool in itself, as when we evaluated our
classifier, while extrinsic evaluation aims at measuring the efficiency of the tool
in its usage environment (in other words, its actual usefulness). This extrinsic
part of the evaluation has yet to be performed, and cannot be achieved using
traditional NLP evaluation methods of comparing the results with a benchmark.
At this stage, extensive usage and user satisfaction are the best indicators we
can identify as to the usefulness and relevance of the solutions we propose.
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